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Inaction is sometimes the optimal path—a point well taken by economists. In her substantial 
volume on optimal control, economist Nancy Stokey begins: “In situations where action 
entails a fixed adjustment cost, optimal policies involve doing nothing most of the time and 
exercising control only occasionally.”1 When fixed adjustment costs exist, the investment 
profile over time tends to be characterized by sudden shifts followed by periods of complete 
inaction; economists often refer to this as a “lumpy” investment profile. 
Much literature on information security focuses on how cybersecurity threats occur and how 
to best resolve them. However, additional factors, such as the risk environment, 
interdependent actors, attackers’ reuse of exploits, and patching vulnerabilities contribute to 
chief information security officers’ (CISOs’) defense strategies.  Indeed, in many cases, the 
optimal decision is to wait until the degree of uncertainty changes and the benefits of action 
outweigh the costs. 
The Defensive Investment Problem 
CISOs typically ask two questions: How do we measure our return on security investment? 
And how, on an empirical cost–benefit basis, do we know when to patch, fix, or shut down 
systems and when new vulnerabilities arise? Both questions address optimal control 
problems in the presence of fixed adjustment costs. These costs might be known, or they 
may contain uncertain forward-looking components, and there is a trade-off between these 
costs versus uncertain future gains. 
It’s difficult to measure return on security investment. The constantly evolving state of the 
“market for attacks” increases the difficulty in determining a security investment’s true value. 
A firm’s senior corporate officer rarely knows empirically (for instance, by audit) whether the 
firm has had no known security incidents because the firm: 
 is spending exactly the right amount on security; 
 is spending many times more than it needs; 
 is spending too little, but attackers haven’t stumbled across its vulnerabilities or found it 
worthwhile to exploit them; or  
 is under attack but doesn’t know it. 
To determine a decision’s optimal timing, much information is needed about the nature of 
uncertain future outcomes; for example, a security manager might wait to see if an exploit 
will be available for a vulnerability.  However, managing cybersecurity investment receives 
less quantitative support than other typical risk-management activities undertaken by a firm. 
For instance, most firms actively manage interest rate and foreign exchange risk through 
their treasury management functions. These activities are carefully accounted for in 
corporate reports alongside their normal operational activities. Booked losses on hedging 
can be very large, but senior corporate officers and investors generally understand that it’s 
important to hedge currency and interest rate risk, even if the specifics are hazy. 
On the other hand, many CISOs struggle to procure adequate budget until after a significant 
event has occurred. The decision to invest in a security fix or control appears to be 
increasingly well understood—for large technology companies at least. The decision process 
for the deployment of a patch is roughly as follows: 
 Determine the security flaw’s severity and level of impact on the organization (possibly 
using the US National Institute of Standards and Technology Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System calculator). 
 Determine the danger of implementing a patch and how much testing is required to 
ensure that the patch is less destructive than the threat. 
 After weighing the first two steps, triage the update to either an immediate 
implementation or a regular update cycle. 
In a case study on optimal patching, Christos Ioannidis and his colleagues, among others, 
postulated a quantitative trade-off between the increasing risk of doing nothing and the 
deterministic cost associated with potentially incomplete mitigation.2  Indeed, the patching 
problem is an archetypal fixed adjustment cost in a security setting; part of the objective of 
this article is to provide a consistent treatment of this problem. So, instead of management’s 
failure to provide resources to underfunded information security departments being a 
catastrophic misstep, a delay in the implementation of security investment controls might be 
a sensible trade-off between risk and investment. Many economic models suggest that the 
tactic of postponing updates might be gaining popularity—not because C-level employees 
are taking unreasonable risks, but because of an older, much more formidable foe: the tiny 
adjustments that drive us to the Nash equilibrium, wherein agents continually make choices 
as they strategize actions and respond to those of others. 
In security decision making, we can model the Nash equilibrium problem using three groups 
of agents: attackers, firms, and government.  Attackers decide to invest in a malware or 
hacking effort, firms in defensive security and regulations, and government in enforcement. 
Their payoff structures will differ. 
For instance, hackers might value chaos over money, and firms and governments might 
value coverage in addition to a simple likelihood × impact calculation. Each will have its own 
subjective discount factors transforming future value of costs and benefits into risk-adjusted 
current values; therefore, the relative present valuation of costs and benefits will be 
idiosyncratic across the various agents in the economy. 
The Attackers’ Economy 
Agents working as attackers are economic actors with preferences—so who are the attackers, 
and what do we know about them? Prior security investment literature typically views 
attackers as essentially random number generators.3 Generators consider a set of 
vulnerabilities in commonly used software, firmware, and hardware and then throw malicious 
agents at this set. Eventually, technical proficiency and vulnerability combine to create a tool 
that can threaten the economic and physical well-being of the selected targets. 
Looking at the relative scale of a threat versus the scale of investment to mitigate the threat, 
UN estimated in 2015 that global annual gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated 
between US$60 and $80 trillion in 2014.4 Estimates for the size of the cybersecurity industry 
are somewhat difficult to ascertain; in 2014 Gartner estimated that the cybersecurity industry 
accounts for approximately $77 billion—less than one-tenth of 1 percent of global GDP 
compared to conventional security expenditure on defense equipment and physical security, 
which is approximately 4 percent of the GDP at just under $400 billion.5   
On the other side of the attack–defense equation, our study examining transactions in a 
Russian online hacker market (which Google and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation 
indicate accounts for a majority of online deployed malware tools) found that transaction 
sizes are quite low, often in the hundreds of dollars, and only rarely in the tens of 
thousands.6 Although the underground hacker market appears to be a well-functioning 
economy, it is potentially significantly smaller than the opposing security industry. 
Of course, the unit of account for losses might differ dramatically from the unit of account 
for rewards. If we look at insurance claims against cyberattacks from industry surveys, the 
claims from US firms are similarly very small; between 2011 and 2013, the median claim was 
$750,000 and the high was $13.5 million. This individual claim represented approximately 10 
percent of total claims made.7  
What do we take from this? The data on the insurance market and our understanding of the 
level of available coverage is incomplete. However, if the level of actual damage is so small, 
then the balance of investment and coverage would indicate an economic puzzle that 
deserves more research. 
  
Attackers’ Motivation 
An additional puzzle comes from a study exploring the menus of vulnerabilities in attackers’ 
malware kits, concluding that attackers are in fact, lazy.8 Owing to the costly effort in 
developing new tools, attackers persist with malware based on existing vulnerabilities, long 
after effective patches have been introduced to the market, as opposed to exploiting new 
vulnerabilities in the systems. Fixed costs appear to make attackers’ investment decisions as 
similarly lumpy (that is, uncertain) as those surrounding the defense dilemma decisions of 
their corresponding targets. 
Another interesting facet of cyberattackers is their psychological profile and self-perception 
in terms of criminality, which affects software engineers’ decisions to deploy labor for legal 
productive efforts or those deemed illegal. Attackers appear to be able to switch liberally 
between standard software engineering projects and those that would normally be deemed 
illegal. The criminology literature indicates that the profiles associated with a cyberattacker 
reveal a far lower persistence in offending; hackers choose to do work they feel is optimal for 
their own welfare rather than identify themselves by the offending activity.9,10 
Although this is somewhat unhelpful for quantitative work, we can reasonably conjecture 
that the pool of threats that security industry faces is uncertain. If attackers’ fixed costs 
change, we could see a sudden and dramatic increase or decrease in attack intensity, with 
little way to predict such shifts. As we discussed, because of a lack of robust historical data 
on attackers and their behavior, each observation might be the result of an equilibrium 
formed from a very different experiment. Identifying causal relationships directly from data is 
an inherently fraught process, and the lack of detailed understanding of the attacker 
production function compounds this problem (for more information, see the “Econometrics” 
sidebar). 
 
Externalities and Dependencies 
How do firms’ operational-level micro security decisions aggregate to the macro and hence 
the public policy level? Aggregation brings certain benefits as idiosyncratic impacts from 
events on single firms even out. However, public policy mandates on security policy must be 
implemented at the micro level, and inappropriately onerous requirements could generate 
costs for the productive side of the economy that are potentially unwarranted and almost 
certainly unfair. The cybersecurity literature is starting to demonstrate an emerging 
awareness of issues that arise when companies have the ability to control both the risk-
generating mechanism and the source of contingent compensation in the event of a 
breach.11 Ranjan Pal and his colleagues illustrated this problem by devising a model in which 
a security vendor provides both a monopoly service and a monopoly provision of insurance, 
and the combined monopolies generate a substantial profit. 
In a network of firms, the provision of security has several dependencies, both indirect and 
direct (that is, through direct technical interconnections, such as shared data facilities and 
electronic communications networks for financial institutions). Direct connections have been 
studied extensively in the recent literature, whereas indirect connections are a more recent 
research interest. For a classic description of the interdependency problem in security, see 
“Interdependent Security,” and for a full network game with contagion, see Network Security 
and Contagion.12,13  
Indirect connections address the risk environment. This is the change in a firm’s risk profile 
due to the choices of other firms in the network—not through direct linkages but as a result 
of changes in the overall number and intensity of attackers as a result of their perceived 
returns on investment. The provision of public goods in networks has been the subject of 
significant interest in recent research.14,15 From a security perspective, it’s important that 
investment has a public good component in addition to the private benefits to the firm. 
A good is considered public if it is nonrival and nonexcludable— that is, the good is enjoyed 
simultaneously by an unlimited number of consumers, and it is impossible to prevent others 
from gaining free access to the good. Note that only aspects of security have a common 
property through the aggregate effect on attackers’ expected payoffs. Moreover, it might be 
more appropriate to consider aspects of security to be closer to a common property good—
that is, the cost of exclusion in consumption of security investment is very high—as opposed 
to impossible in the pure public good case. 
Applying this idea, it seems that if I increase my effort in an activity and it has a positive spill-
over effect to you (for example, I invest in more security and discourage a small amount of 
the aggregate number of attackers, thereby reducing my own risk), then all agents in my 
network will engage in this virtuous cycle until a Nash equilibrium is reached. (Note that this 
might not be as desirable as a coordinated action mediated by policymakers). However, 
consider the patching problem for network or client software. Many firms’ information 
platforms’ modular components are specialized and interconnected. Applying a patch in one 
system might have unintended consequences for other systems (for instance, if a vendor 
drops legacy support). As such, patches commonly need to be tested, particularly for critical 
systems. This means that applications of patches have fixed costs, and as we ramp up these 
fixed costs, the degree of patching coverage drops, and the firms in an economic network 
suffer through the interdependency in security as we forestall or neglect investments at 
critical points. This vulnerability does not stem from direct interconnections but via the 
attractiveness for attackers to invest in attacks that often have very little specific targeting 
other than a certain platform or a vulnerable library still used in a legacy system. Even 
though the attack may not have been particularly profitable to the attacker, the damage to 
the firm may still be quite severe.  
The lumpy investment profile is also reflected in the security interdependencies with other 
firms; more important, the lumpy profile of a large firm can be felt across the network either 
directly or indirectly. Indeed, this observation formed the basis of early research on the 
importance of liability sharing in security patch management.16 Hence, fixed costs appear to 
exaggerate already problematic issues of externalities, transmitting costs between firms, and 
form the basis of our conjecture that unpredictable investment generates excess aggregate 
security threats. If attackers can expect to make a good profit because somebody out there is 
unpatched, they will continue to invest time and effort in their current technology before 
switching to a new one. 
Thus, the opportunity set and expected reward for attackers is formed from the aggregation 
of all unpatched vulnerabilities, many of which will be the result of small delays in 
investment. Hence, there is potentially a feedback mechanism sustaining firms’ risks beyond 
the process of new vulnerability discovery. 
Waiting to invest in cybersecurity may be deemed a poor risk management strategy, despite 
many standard models indicating that delaying investment until the nature of the uncertainty 
is clear is often the most appropriate course of action. A manager investing in cybersecurity 
infrastructure must determine the costs of inaction (which might be a function of 
accumulating risks) versus the cost of action (which might be fixed or have a random 
forward-looking component). These optimal control problems will likely depend on the joint 
decision making of all actors in a security context. This is in contrast to models of optimal 
decision making that treat a threat as a random external event in their environment (that is, 
an emergent risk). Furthermore, if attackers have the same type of investment decision 
making problem (upfront, fixed investments and continuous variable costs), we might find 
that the adjustment path for the intensity of attacks on firms increases the unpredictability of 
associated risks. Ergo, small changes in regulatory policy could lead to substantial 
unexpected changes in the threat environment. 
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